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AN EXAMINATION OF
THE CONDONATION DOCTRINE
by Marvin M. Moore*
I. IntroductionU NDER AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW a spouse who has once
condoned a marital transgression by his mate is thereafter
barred from using that transgression as grounds for divorce.,
All of the common grounds for divorce, including adultery,
cruelty, habitual drunkenness, and desertion, are subject to the
condonation principle. 2 The doctrine had its origin in the canon
law of the Roman Catholic Church,3 where it was applied by
the ecclesiastical courts in adjudicating petitions for divorce (a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron College of Law.
1 A common, although general, definition of condonation is "the forgiveness
of an antecedent matrimonial offense on condition that it shall not be re-
peated, and the offender shall thereafter treat the forgiving party with con-
jugal kindness." 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 59 (1959). Pobst v. Pobst, 317 S.W. 2d
655 (Mo. 1958) and Henning v. Henning, 89 Ariz. 330, 362 P. 2d 124 (1961)
give a definition virtually identical with this.
Four jurisdictions have statutes giving a formal definition of condona-
tion. Cal. Civ. Code § 115 (1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 21-121 (1961);
N. D. Cent. Code §§ 14-05-13 (1960); and S. D. Code § 14.07 16 (1939). The
California act states: "Condonation is the conditional forgiveness of a matri-
monial offense constituting a cause of divorce."
Seventeen other states have enactments containing a phrase or sentence
giving some indication of the meaning of "condonation" within the juris-
diction. Ala. Code tit. 34, § 26 (1959); Alaska Comp. Laws § 56-5-11 (1960);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-313 (1956); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1528 (1953);
Hawaii Rev. Laws tit. 324-26 (1961); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 3-1202 (1965); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.040 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.41 (1967); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 518.08 (1947); Miss. Code Ann. § 2735 (1957); N. Y. Doam. Rel.
Law § 171; Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.070 (1965); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 52 (1955)
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-811 (1955); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4630 (1960); W.
Va. Code Ann. § 48-2-14 (1966); and Wyo. Stat. § 20-54 (1959). The Ala-
bama statute provides: "No decree (of divorce) can be rendered ... where
there has been a condonation of adultery by the admission of the offending
party to conjugal embraces, after knowledge of the commission of the
crime."
2 However, the courts-sometimes under statutory compulsion-invoke the
doctrine less readily against petitioners relying upon so-called "continuing"
grounds of divorce (such as cruelty and personal indignities) than they do
against plaintiffs aggrieved by transgressions of a non-continuing character
(such as adultery). See Part II B infra.
3 Annot., 32 A.L.R. 2d 107, 112 (1953) and Collins v. Collins (1884) 9 A.C.
205.
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mensa et thoro) 4 grounded on cruelty or adultery. 5 The prin-
ciple survived the changes caused by the Reformation to subsist
as part of English ecclesiastical law,6 was brought to America by
the English colonists, 7 and was received by the American courts
(none of which were ecclesiastical tribunals) 8 as a part of the
common law.9 Today over half the states have statutes providing
for the application of condonation, 0 and the doctrine operates as
a common law rule in the remaining jurisdictions."
It appears that the ecclesiastical courts had two reasons-
one theoretical and one policy-oriented-for devising and apply-
ing the rule. First, the canonists regarded divorce (a mensa et
thoro) as a remedy allowed an innocent spouse who has been
wronged, and they viewed the divorce decree as both a vindica-
tion of the petitioner-spouse and a condemnation of the defend-
ant.'2 (This view should be contrasted with the modern socio-
logical concept of divorce as being simply a formal recognition
that a marriage has ceased to function.)1 3 The canonists rea-
soned, logically enough, that if the aggrieved spouse had once
forgiven his errant mate for particular misconduct, it would be
4 The divorce a mensa et thoro (legal separation) was the only kind of di-
vorce obtainable in the ecclesiastical courts, for the Catholic Church did not
recognize an absolute divorce under any circumstances. 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 440 (2 1st ed. 1857) and Note, Divorce
and Recrimination, 13 Ore. L. Rev. 335, 339 (1924).
5 Note, A Survey of the Law of Condonation, Collusion, and Connivance in
New England, 35 B.U.L. Rev. 99, 100 (1955).
6 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 202 (1966).
7 J. Bishop, Bishop on Marriage and Divorce 54-56 (12th ed. 1881).
8 Id. at §§ 117 and 120. Also see Cotter v. Cotter, 225 Fed. 471 (C.C.A.
Alaska 1915).
9 Reader, The Meaning of Condonation in the Law of Divorce, 40 Dick. L.
Rev. 92 (1935).
10 Statutory citations are given at note 101 infra.
11 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 202 (1966); Note, A Survey of
the Law of Condonation, Collusion, and Connivance in New England, 35
B.U.L. Rev. 99 (1955).
By the weight of authority condonation is an affirmative defense which
must be pleaded. 1 W. Nelson, Nelson on Divorce and Annulment § 11.12
(1945). Nevertheless, a number of cases have held that the court may prop-
erly deny a divorce if the evidence discloses condonation, even though the
doctrine has not been pleaded. Among such decisions are Buck v. Buck,
205 Ark. 918, 171 S.W. 2d 939 (1943); Doose v. Doose, 198 Ill. App. 387
(1923); and Sewell v. Sewell, 160 Neb. 173, 69 N.W. 2d 549 (1955).
12 MacDougall, Proposals to Reform the Law of Condonation, 39 Aust. L. J.
295, 296 (1966).
13 See Alexander, Legal Science and the Social Sciences: The Family Court,
21 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1956).
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unfair to allow the former to subsequently complain of the par-
doned transgressions (in the absence of later misdeeds serving
to revive the initial misconduct).14 Secondly, the ecclesiastics
wished to hold' divorces to a minimum,15 and they believed that
the doctrine would serve this policy by creating a bar to some
divorces that would otherwise have to be granted. 16
It is apparent from the foregoing that the condonation prin-
ciple has achieved both widespread acceptance and historical re-
spectability. Nevertheless, it is submitted that an examination
of the doctrine will disclose that its merits are open to serious
question. The purpose of this article is to provide such an exam-
ination. The material comprising this study is (excluding the
Introduction and Conclusion) divided into five principal sections:
(1) the elements of condonation, including knowledge and (ex-
press or implied) forgiveness; (2) the revival doctrine; (3) the
present status of condonation in the United States and England;
(4) objections to the bar; and (5) possible reforms.
II. Elements of Condonation
A. Knowledge of the Offense
(1) Extent of knowledge required to render doctrine applicable:
An essential ingredient of condonation is knowledge of the
infraction alleged to have been condoned.1 7 Although this re-
14 MacDougall, supra note 12, at 296. One can argue, plausibly enough,
that if a person cannot revoke an inter vivos gift of personal property (a
principle that has long been recognized, R. Brown, The Law of Personal
Property, § 37 (2d ed. 1955)) he should not be allowed to revoke a gift of
forgiveness.
15 L. Marshall and G. May, The Divorce Court 19 (1932).
16 See Poynter, A Concise View of the Doctrine and Practice of the Eccle-
siastical Courts, 13 Law Library 81-83 (1836).
There is considerable evidence that today condonation, by discouraging
efforts at reconciliation, tends to promote divorce, instead of minimizing the
phenomenon. Mayer, Suspension of Condonation Defense Increases Recon-
ciliations, 28 Tex. Bar J. 737 (1965). If the doctrine had this effect in the
past, the ecclesiastics apparently were not aware of the fact.
17 Dase v. Dase, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 144, 152 N.E. 2d 20 (1958); Cunningham v.
Cunningham, 278 Ala. 90, 176 So. 2d 22 (1965); and Rosenthal v. Rosenthal,
311 S.W. 2d 294 (Tex. 1958). Quoting from the Dase decision: "Condonation
is a voluntary forgiveness of a matrimonial offense by an aggrieved spouse;
for it to be voluntary, there must be knowledge of the offense ... " Page
22 of 152 N.E. 2d.
Twenty-three of the twenty-six states with statutes providing for the
application of condonation expressly require knowledge in their code pro-
(Continued on next page)
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quirement is applicable regardless of what grounds are relied
upon for divorce,1 8 it seldom presents a problem except when the
suit is grounded upon adultery; for when the transgression com-
plained of is cruelty, indignities, or desertion, the aggrieved
spouse will necessarily have been cognizant of the misbehavior.
Although it is well established that knowledge is a requisite
of condonation, the degree of knowledge necessary to satisfy this
requirement has been questioned. Certainly, knowledge does not
embrace mere suspicion,19 but neither does it require absolute
certainty.20 The gradations of knowledge demanded by the de-
cisions range from "full knowledge" at one end of the spectrum
to "probable knowledge" at the other, with a number of decisions
adopting a middle course and demanding "reasonable knowl-
edge." A case in which the "full knowledge" standard was ap-
plied is Day v. Day.21 There the husband sought a divorce on
the grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty, and defendant
cross-petitioned for the same relief on the ground of extreme
cruelty. The trial court denied both parties a divorce, ruling
that plaintiff had condoned defendant's transgressions and that
defendant's cross-petition was barred by the recrimination doc-
trine.22 On appeal plaintiff contended that though he forgave de-
fendant and cohabited with her for nearly two years after learn-
ing of her sexual relations with one H. C., plaintiff's conduct did
not amount to condonation, since he long believed that defendant
yielded to H. C. against her will. Speaking to this issue, the Su-
preme Court of Kansas declared:
(Continued from preceding page)
visions. The three jurisdictions with enactments that make no express refer-
ence to the knowledge requirement are Idaho Code Ann. § 32-614 (1958);
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 152 (1957); and Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1959). The other
states are listed at note 101 infra.
Is Reader, Knowledge or Belief as a Prerequisite to Condonation in the Law
of Divorce, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 408, 409 (1936).
19 "Cohabitation after knowledge by a spouse of circumstances which ex-
cite suspicion merely of a marital offense by the other spouse does not
amount to condonation." Annot., 109 A.L.R. 683, 692 (1937). See Needham
v. Needham, 299 S.W. 832 (Mo. 1927).
20 Farley v. Farley, 278 Mich. 361, 270 N.W. 711 (1936).
21 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974 (1905).
22 The prevailing view in the United States today is that a misdeed which
has been condoned cannot be used for recrimination purposes. 24 Am. Jur.
2d Divorce and Separation § 232 (1966). However, Kansas apparently fol-
lows the old ecclesiastical rule, which permitted a condoned offense to be
used as a recriminatory defense. See Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 789, 162
Eng. Rep. 755 (1799).
Spring, 1969
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 2 [1969], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol2/iss2/1
EXAMINATION OF CONDONATION DOCTRINE
"An essential element of condonation is a full knowledge
by the injured spouse of the marital misconduct of the
offender. If the plaintiff had only an unconfirmed suspicion
that his wife had gone astray, or if he believed that the
numerous acts of adultery brought to his attention were
without her consent, his continuance of the marital relation
would not amount to an effective forgiveness or con-
donation." 23
A case illustrating use of the "probable knowledge" test is
Connelly v. Connelly,24 an action brought by the husband and
grounded on intolerable indignities. At the trial it was disclosed
that plaintiff had continued conjugal cohabitation with defendant
after becoming apprised of evidence suggesting that the latter
was conducting a serious flirtation, if not an illicit affair, with
one P. M. The trial judge found that defendant was guilty of the
indiscretions charged and that her conduct had created a public
scandal, but it nevertheless dismissed plaintiff's petition, ruling
that plaintiff had debarred himself from relief by condoning de-
fendant's misbehavior. Discussing this issue, the St. Louis Court
of Appeals said:
"(T) he doctrine of condonation is usually .. .stated to
be that cohabitation after probable knowledge of the offense,
is a presumptive remission of it . . .Circumstances of mere
suspicion are not adequate .... , 25
23 Page 975 of 80 Pac. Since the evidence presented made it apparent that
plaintiff could not possibly have failed to realize defendant's guilt, the Su-
preme Court of Kansas affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Accord,
Turton v. Turton, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 338, 162 Eng. Rep. 1178 (1830); Zuerrer v.
Zuerrer, 238 Iowa 402, 27 N.W. 2d 260 (1947); and Stone v. Stone, 378 S.W.
2d 824 (Mo. 1964). In the latter case the St. Louis Court of Appeals held
that the husband did not condone his wife's adultery, because he did not
have "full knowledge" of it. Quoting from the opinion: "The term 'con-
donation,' as used in divorce law, means forgiveness and pardon after full
knowledge of past wrong.... (I)n our judgment plaintiff did not become
aware of the full extent of defendant's misconduct . . . until a few days
before the final separation, and there was no condonation of this marital
offense." Pages 838-39 of 378 S.W. 2d.
24 98 Mo. App. 95, 71 S.W. 1111 (1903).
25 Page 1113 of 71 S.W. Although recognizing that "probable knowledge"
is something less than "absolute knowledge" (and presumably, than "full
knowledge"), the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had not even
acquired the former until after the parties' separation, and it reversed.
Accord, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 4 Mass. 147 (1809) and Delliber v. Del-
liber, 9 Conn. 233 (1832). In the latter case the Connecticut Supreme Court
of Errors, invoking the condonation doctrine, dismissed the divorce petition
of a wife who had voluntarily spent three nights in prison with her hus-
band, knowing that he had been convicted of the adultery now alleged as
divorce grounds. Said the court:
(Continued on next page)
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Quincey v. Quincey26 appears to be the leading American
case to apply the "reasonable knowledge" standard. There the
husband, a mariner, instituted a divorce suit grounded on adul-
tery, charging that defendant had been unfaithful while plaintiff
was at sea. Defendant did not deny the adultery, but argued that
plaintiff had condoned the offense by living with defendant (as
husband and wife) for several days after gaining knowledge of
facts strongly suggestive of her disloyalty. Addressing itself to
this defense, the New Hampshire Superior Court of Judicature
declared:
"If, having reasonable knowledge of the infidelity of his
wife, and of his power to make proof of it, the husband, not-
withstanding, cohabits with her as a wife, this is an implied
condonation and bars him of any right to avail himself of the
... adultery as a cause of divorce.... It could not be con-
tended that a confession would not furnish reasonable knowl-
edge of her guilt." 27
Since the terms "full knowledge," "reasonable knowledge,"
and "probable knowledge" have different dictionary meanings,
one would suppose that a jurisdiction which uses the last-named
standard will more readily invoke the condonation bar against
a divorce-plaintiff than will a state which employs the first-
mentioned test. In practice, however, no such pattern is discern-
ible in the reported cases. 28
(Continued from preceding page)
"It is a rule that the party seeking a divorce must have probable
knowledge of the crime committed, when cohabitation is indulged, to
lay a foundation for a pardon .... The knowledge need not arise from
vision of the fact, nor from the confession of the accused. It is sufficient
that she knew that he had been convicted." Page 234 of 9 Conn.
26 10 N.H. 272 (1839).
27 Page 274 of 10 N.H. Since it appeared that plaintiff had refused to co-
habit with defendant after becoming informed of the most incriminating
evidence against her, and since his earlier suspicions were based upon evi-
dence too insubstantial to provide him with reasonable knowledge of her
infidelity, the court held that there was no condonation and that plaintiff
was entitled to a divorce. Accord, Melinn v. Melinn, 329 Mich. 96, 44 N.W.
2d 886 (1950); Greirns v. Greims, 80 N.J. Eq. 233, 83 Atl. 1001 (1912); and
Dunn v. Dunn, 2 Phill. Ecc. 403, 161 Eng. Rep. 1182 (1817). In the Melinn
case the principal question in issue was whether the plaintiff's recriminatory
adultery had been condoned. Concluding that it had not been condoned, the
Supreme Court of Michigan said:
"(I)t is sufficient as a basis for a condonation that the non-offending
spouse had such knowledge as would satisfy a reasonably prudent per-
son that the offense had been committed." Page 888 of 44 N.W. 2d.
28 A reading of the condonation cases listed in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Decennial Digests discloses that the States of Kansas and Iowa, which em-
(Continued on next page)
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The degree of knowledge formally required by a given juris-
diction appears to have much less bearing on a given decision
than does the court's (or jury's) judgment on whether the plain-
tiff believed the evidence-whether extensive or tenuous--of his
spouse's misconduct. 29 In general the cases seem to support the
following observation:
"It is the acceptance [by plaintiff] of the information as
true or the discarding of it as unworthy of belief, in other
words the belief in guilt or innocence, that is controlling....
(D)espite the judicial language, the motivating principle of
the cases . . . is that belief in guilt is a condition precedent
to the condonation of a marital offense." 30
That the court should regard a belief test as preferable to a
quantum-of-knowledge test is understandable. One cannot par-
don a transgression unless he believes that one has been com-
mitted. One cannot forgive his spouse unless he believes that the
latter is guilty of some misdeed. Certainly the facts of which the
injured spouse was apprised-i.e., the extent of his knowledge-
have a bearing upon what he probably believed, but it would
seem that the ultimate determinant should be his subjective be-
lief, not the completeness of his knowledge.
(Continued from preceding page)
ploy the "full knowledge" test are not perceptibly slower to invoke the bar
of condonation than are the jurisdictions of Connecticut and Missouri, which
use the "probable knowledge" standard.
29 Occasionally a court has expressly stated that it considers the plaintiff's
belief to be the decisive issue, as in the following three cases:
"In order to establish condonation, it is not enough to prove that
the husband took his wife back after certain facts had come to his
knowledge . . . tending to prove her adultery; it is necessary to prove
that the husband took his wife back . . . believing her to be guilty. If
the evidence leads the court to the conclusion that the husband did not
thoroughly believe that his wife had been guilty, . . . condonation is not
established." Ellis v. Ellis, 4 S.W. and Tr. 154, 164 Eng. Rep. 1475
(1865).
"But the true import of the rule, in my opinion, is that the co-
habitation of the husband, after the commission of the offense, and
after he believes, on probable evidence, the guilt of his wife, is con-
clusive evidence of the remission .... Without that belief he cannot
have knowledge of the crime; for he may have received the information
without giving it credit." Anonymous v. Anonymous, 4 Mass. 147
(1809).
"Knowledge of a spouse's adultery required to establish condonance
exists when there is either actual [apparently visual] knowledge or
a belief that the offense has been committed; and the existence of such
belief in libellant's mind is a question to be determined on the basis of
credible testimony." Shumaker v. Shumaker, 50 Lanc. Rev. 431 (Pa.
1955).
30 Reader, supra note 18, at 415.
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(2) Means of proving case in court:
There is substantial treatise authority, supported by consid-
erable dicta in the cases, that a plaintiff's knowledge (or belief)
will not be deemed adequate to activate the condonation rule
unless he had the means of proving his mate's misconduct. 31 De-
clares Corpus Juris Secundum:
"(A) lthough the innocent spouse entertains a suspicion
or conviction of the other's infidelity, a continuance of the
marital cohabitation is not condonation, unless he has the
means of proving the offense. . . ," 32
And states the Supreme Court of Florida in Von Funk v.
Von Funk: 33
"(M) arital infidelity is only to be regarded as condoned
where there is a definite continuation of cohabitation after
evidence sufficient to legally establish the offense has come
to the knowledge of the condoning party."
Notwithstanding the comparative frequency with which this
proposition is encountered (mostly in the older cases), the writer
has been unable to find one decision that actually rested on it-
that is, one case in which a spouse who continued to cohabit after
obtaining knowledge of his mate's transgressions was neverthe-
less granted a divorce because he did not have the means of
establishing defendant's guilt in court. Furthermore, a search
has unearthed no case decided within the last twenty years that
even contains dicta supporting the proposition. Whether the
alleged rule is devoid of all life is questionable, but one can safe-
ly assert that its pulse beat is exceedingly faint.
31 Treatise authority to this effect: Nelson, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 11.07;
S. Kling, The Complete Guide to Divorce 195 (1963); and 24 Am. Jur. 2d
Divorce and Separation § 210 (1966). Quoting from the last authority:
"It has been held that the innocent spouse must have the means of
proving such misconduct before he may be held to have condoned the
offense; otherwise the aggrieved spouse is placed in a dilemma where
he cannot prove the offender's guilt but will be charged with desertion
if he acts on his information by leaving the offender."
Cases containing dicta to this effect: D'Aguilar v. D'Aguilar, 1 Hagg. 773,
162 Eng. Rep. 748 (1794); Davis v. Davis, 19 Ill. 334 (1857); Hofmire v. Hof-
mire, 7 Paige (N.Y.) 60, 32 Am. Dec. 611 (1838); and Abbott v. Abbott, 132
Misc. 11, 228 N.Y. Supp. 611 (1928).
32 27 A C.J.S. Divorce § 60 (1959).
33 120 Fla. 103, 162 So. 145, 147 (1935).
Spring, 1969
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(3) Condonation of known misdeed as embracing unknown
offenses:
A number of cases have presented the question of whether
the pardoning of one offense constitutes condonation of a like or
comparable offense of which the aggrieved spouse had no knowl-
edge at the time. The courts have usually answered this question
in the negative. 34
An illustrative case is McKee v. McKee. 5 Here the plaintiff,
a naval officer, sought a divorce for adultery committed with one
G. R. on Labor Day of 1963 and New Year's Day of 1964. De-
fendant argued that plaintiff had condoned her unfaithfulness by
expressly forgiving her (and afterwards copulating with her) for
committing adultery with one R. P. on January 19, 1964. How-
ever, the evidence revealed that when plaintiff condoned the Jan-
uary 19 transgression he had not yet learned of the other affairs
and that he promptly left the defendant upon being informed of
them. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a decree
granting plaintiff a divorce, saying:
"Where a defendant is guilty of several matrimonial
offenses, and the plaintiff, when he forgives the defendant,
knows of one of them but not of the others, the condonation
operates as to the known offense; but because of the lack of
knowledge the forgiveness does not bar an action based on
the others." 36
34 Alexandre v. Alexandre, 2 P. and D. 164 (1870); Davis v. Davis, 145 Pa.
Super. 473, 21 A. 2d 419 (1941); Wetenkamp v. Wetenkamp, 140 Neb. 392,
299 N.W. 491 (1941); and Shackleton v. Shackleton, 48 N.J. Eq. 364, 21 Atl.
935 (1891). Quoting from the last-named case:
"The doctrine that the pardon implied from sexual intercourse shall
extend only to offenses known to the pardoning party when the inter-
course occurs is no less a dictate of sound reason than of justice. Will-
ingness to forgive a single offense, or even a series of offenses committed
under circumstances of strong temptation, would not give the least sup-
port to a presumption that the injured party, if he knew the whole
truth, would forgive a long course of profligacy." Page 936 of 21 Ati.
Declares Rayden: "Condonation of an offense which is known will not oper-
ate as a condonation of other prior offenses not known; though neither will
the fact that there exist other offenses not known preclude the condonation
of the known offenses from being effective." L. Rayden, Rayden's Practice
and Law of Divorce 286 (10th ed. 1967).
35 206 Va. 527, 145 S.E. 2d 163 (1965).
36 Page 166 of 145 S.E. 2d. Accord, Uhlmann v. Uhlmann, 17 Abb. (N.Y.)
236, 237 (1885), where the court observed: "A man might forgive a wife
sinning once, and yet would abhor to dwell with a Messalina or Theodora."
However, where the offending spouse has been guilty of numerous
transgressions of an equally culpable character and the aggrieved spouse
(Continued on next page)
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B. Forgiveness, Express or Implied
(1) Whether the forgiveness requirement may be satisfied by
words alone:
It is generally (if not universally) 37 accepted that forgive-
ness is the major ingredient of condonation.3 8 Declares American
Jurisprudence 2d:
"An essential element of condonation is an express or
implied forgiveness of past misconduct. In fact, so pre-
dominant is the factor of forgiveness that many courts have
stated broadly, 'condonation is forgiveness.' " 39
One might suppose that since forgiveness constitutes the
essence of condonation, any unequivocal manifestation of forgive-
ness would amount to condonation, and that a simple verbal
statement of pardon would consequently be enough to invite the
doctrine's application. A few cases have so held. Illustrative
decisions are Bush v. Bush40 and Thompson v. Thompson.41 In
the former case, an action grounded on adultery, it was disclosed
that following the separation which resulted when plaintiff
(husband) learned of defendant's infidelity plaintiff called upon
(Continued from preceding page)
obtains knowledge of a number of them, if the latter condones the offenses
of which he has knowledge, he thereby condones all of the misconduct.
Farley v. Farley, 278 Mich. 361, 270 N.W. 711 (1936); Keats v. Keats, 1 Sw.
and Tr. 334, 164 Eng. Rep. 754 (1859).
The same is true where the guilty spouse confesses his malfeasance in
general terms and his partner condones the misbehavior without inquiring
about specific instances of wrongdoing. Rogers v. Rogers, 122 Mass. 423
(1877) and Moorhouse v. Moorhouse, 90 Ill. App. 401 (1900). Quoting from
the Rogers decision: "It is not necessary when the terms of the condonation
indicate an intention to forgive, without inquiry, all previous injury, that
there should be actual knowledge of each distinct offense." Pages 424-25
of 122 Mass.
3T At least one authority believes that condonation rests on a concept of
waiver, or election, rather than on forgiveness. Reader, supra note 9. This
is discussed in part II B (2) infra.
38 Virtually all definitions of condonation found in judicial opinions stress
the element of forgiveness. The following definition, found in Maughan v.
Maughan, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 282, 184 N.E. 2d 628 (1961) is typical: "Condo-
nation is the voluntary forgiveness, either express or implied, by an ag-
grieved spouse of a breach in marital duty . . . with an implied condition
that the offense shall not be repeated." Similar definitions are found in:
Henning v. Henning, 80 Ariz. 330, 362 P. 2d 124 (1961); Workman v. Work-
man, 164 Neb. 642, 83 N.W. 2d 368 (1957); and McLaughlin v. McLaughlin
244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E. 2d 537 (1964).
39 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 208 (1966).
40 135 Ark. 512, 205 S.W. 895 (1918).
41 35 Nev. 375, 247 Pac. 545 (1926).
Spring, 1969
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defendant, agreed upon terms of reconciliation, and invited de-
fendant to return home with him. About ten minutes after the
couple had returned home plaintiff changed his mind, told de-
fendant that they could not be happy together, and over the lat-
ter's protest took her back to her parents' home. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas held that even though there had been no re-
sumption of marital relations, plaintiff had done enough to effect
a condonation. Said the court:
"It is true that he (plaintiff) changed his mind and
undertook to rescind his acts of forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion before the resumed relations with his wife had pro-
ceeded to the extent of actual cohabitation or sexual inter-
course, but it is not essential that the relation should have
proceeded to that extent in order to become complete and
binding. . . . 'It has been argued that nothing less than re-
newed sexual intercourse will be sufficient to establish con-
donation. It is obvious . . . that in some cases this may be
a test wholly inapplicable.' " 42
In the Thompson case the husband sought a divorce on the
ground of desertion, and his wife argued, in defense, that plain-
tiff had deserted her earlier. Plaintiff countered this defense with
evidence that subsequent to his desertion of defendant (and
other misconduct) the couple executed a written agreement of
reconciliation in which each expressly pardoned the other for all
offenses. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed a decree grant-
ing plaintiff a divorce, ruling that by signing the reconciliation
agreement defendant condoned plaintiff's desertion and other
misbehavior-even though the couple never re-established mari-
tal relations afterwards. Quoting from the opinion:
"But it is contended by counsel that there can be no
condonation where there is no cohabitation and that there
was no cohabitation between the parties after the agreement
was signed. While it is true, as contended, that there was no
cohabitation, we are not in accord with the contention made.
. . . (F) orgiveness is generally established by the conduct of
the party, but an express forgiveness may be shown, and
when shown, is as binding as one shown by proof of co-
habitation." 43
42 Page 897 of 205 S.W. In the last sentence the court was quoting from
Keats v. Keats, 1 Sw. and Tr. 334, 164 Eng. Rep. 754, 756 (1859).
43 Page 546 of 247 Pac. Accord, Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199, 114 S.E. 185(1922) and Pitman v. Pitman, 66 D.L.R. 702 (Manitoba 1940).
Seven jurisdictions have statutes which provide that forgiveness can be
(Continued on next page)
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However, the distinct weight of authority supports the prop-
osition that condonation cannot occur without the resumption of
sexual relations. 44 "It is almost universally held that there can
be no condonation of a marital offense without any act of marital
cohabitation." 45 In ten states the statute providing for operation
of the condonation doctrine demands a resumption of sexual
intercourse. 46  Among the cases which have held the re-
establishment of coition to be essential are Lowensten v. Lowen-
sten47 and Christensen v. Christensen.4s The former was a divorce
action instituted by the wife, who grounded her suit on both
adultery and cruelty. The evidence revealed that defendant, a
dentist, had been sexually intimate with several of his patients
and that plaintiff had condoned one of the transgressions by co-
habiting with defendant after surprising the couple in flagrante
delicto. However, after pardoning the offense in question plain-
tiff learned, through an office diary kept by defendant, that he
was guilty of other adulteries, and following this discovery, she
ceased to cohabit with him. At the trial defendant testified that
though there were no further marital relations after plaintiff read
the diary, plaintiff verbally forgave defendant and promised to
(Continued from preceding page)
shown either by a resumption of marital cohabitation or by evidence of an
express (verbal) pardon. Alaska Comp. Laws § 56-5-11 (1960) (not true of
all grounds); Hawaii Rev. Laws tit. 324-26 (1961); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 552.41 (1967); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.08 (1947); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 171;
Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.070 (1965) (not true of all grounds); and Wyo. Stat.
§ 20-54 (1959).
44 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 60 (1959); H. Clark, Cases and Problems on Domes-
tic Relations 585 (1965); Crocker v. Crocker (1920) P. 25; Taber v. Taber,
66 Atl. 1082 (N.J. 1904); Thomason v. Thomason, 332 S.W. 2d 148 (Tex.
1959); and Buck v. Buck, 205 Ark. 918, 171 S.W. 2d 929 (1943).
45 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 211 (1966).
46 Ala. Code tit. 34, § 26 (1959); Cal. Civ. Code § 116 (1954); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 30-109 (1960); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 3-1202 (1965); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.040
(1962); Miss. Code Arm. § 2735 (1957); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 21-122
(1961); N. D. Cent. Code § 14-05-13 (1960); S. D. Code § 14.0716 (1939);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-811 (1955).
The Montana and Tennessee acts read, respectively, as follows:
"The following requirements are necessary to condonation:
2. Reconciliation and remission of the offense by the injured party.
3. Restoration of the offending party to all marital rights."
"(I)t shall be a good defense and perpetual bar ... if the defend-
ant allege and prove:
... (2) That the complainant has admitted the defendant into con-
jugal society and embraces after knowledge of the criminal act."
47 79 N.J. Super. 124, 190 A. 2d 882 (1963).
48 125 Me. 397; 134 Atl. 373 (1926).
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return to him. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Supe-
rior Court ruled that such an oral pardon would not serve to
work a condonation. Said the court:
"It has been stated that . . . nothing short of a renewal
of sexual relations will amount to a condonation .... For-
giveness by mere words or promises not followed by resto-
ration of the forgiven party to the matrimonial home and bed
will not suffice. We thus do not find condonation from plain-
tiff's implied promises to defendant . . . to return to him." 49
The Christensen controversy was another case in which the
wife sought a divorce for adultery. Defendant argued that plain-
tiff condoned the offense by receiving him back into the home
after learning of the transgression. It was shown however, that
though plaintiff accepted defendant's return and treated him with
civility, she did not resume sexual relations. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Maine affirmed a decree granting plaintiff a divorce,
saying:
"To be effectual, condonation must include a restoration
of the offending party to, or a continuance of, all marital
rights after the offense becomes known. While condonation
imports forgiveness, the converse is not necessarily true. The
offended party may forgive, in that he may not bear any ill
will, yet withhold a complete reconciliation in the sense of
reinstating the offender to conjugal cohabitation and full
marital rights." 50
(2) Whether the forgiveness requirement may be satisfied by
sexual intercourse alone:
The law presumes that a spouse who willingly copulates with
his mate after learning that the latter has committed a marital
offense intends to forgive-and therefore condone-the trans-
gression.51 However, there is a conflict of authority on the ques-
tion of whether this presumption is rebuttable or conclusive. The
prevailing view is that the presumption of forgiveness is rebut-
49 Page 890 of 190 Atl. The Appellate Division did not actually grant plain-
tiff a divorce, but rather, remanded the case for further findings of fact on
certain collateral issues.
50 Pages 373-74 of 134 Atl. Accord, Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Neb. 570, 131
N.W. 907 (1911) and Horton v. Horton, 276 Ky. 104, 122 S.W. 2d 793 (1939).
51 Madden, op. cit. supra note 36, at § 91; Nelson, op. cit. supra note 1, at
§ 11.03; and Peck, The Law of Persons and of Domestic Relations § 46 (3rd
ed. 1930). Quoting from the last source: "Ordinarily the living in marital
relations with the guilty party after knowledge of the offense is proof of
condonation."
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table.52 (In instances when the wife is the aggrieved spouse or
when the suit is grounded on cruelty or some other continuing
offense, the presumption is more easily rebutted than it is in
other situations.) 53 However, a significant number of decisions
have ruled that the presumption is absolute. 54 Two cases illus-
trative of the prevailing view are Seiferth v. Seiferth,5  and Kin-
ley v. Kinley, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 341 (1952). In the former case the
husband filed for a divorce on the ground of cruelty. The de-
fendant argued that plaintiff had condoned her misbehavior by
resuming conjugal cohabitation for a period during the pendency
of the suit. The trial court nevertheless granted plaintiff a di-
vorce, and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed,
speaking as follows:
"The resumption of cohabitation, per se, is not neces-
sarily condonation. It may imply a condoning, but the prin-
cipal element of the defense of condonation is the freely
exercised intent to forgive. . . . The denial of the motion
to dismiss was based on a finding that the element of for-
giveness, essential for condonation, was completely lacking
in the resumption of the relationship herein." 5"
In the Kinley case the wife (defendant) moved to vacate an
interlocutory decree of divorce obtained by the husband, who
had based his suit on the former's adultery. Defendant pre-
sented evidence that following the granting of the decree plain-
tiff visited her one day and engaged in coitus with her. Although
plaintiff did not deny the sexual episode, the Tompkins County
Supreme Court nevertheless denied defendant's motion to vacate
the decree, saying:
52 "The majority of American decisions allow the inference of condonation
from sexual intercourse to be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
that no pardon had been intended." Freed, Defenses Against Divorce in
French and American Law, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 303, 313 (1959). Also see Nelson,
supra note 1, at § 11.03.
53 As discussed in Part II B (4) infra, the courts are slower to invoke con-
donation in bar of relief in cases where the wife is the injured spouse or
where the action is based on a transgression of a continuing character. Six
states have statutes providing that condonation of a continuing transgres-
sion will not be inferred in the absence of an express agreement to forgive.
Alaska Comp. Laws § 56-5-11 (1960); Cal. Civ. Code § 118 (1954); Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. § 21-124 (1961); N. D. Cent. Code § 14-05-13 (1960); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 107.070 (1965); and S. D. Code § 14.0716 (1939).
54 "Many courts state outright that sexual intercourse alone occurring after
the marital wrong is condonation-regardless of intent to forgive (knowl-
edge being assumed)." Note, supra note 11, at 106.
55 132 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1961).
56 Pages 472-73 of 132 So. 2d.
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"We must bear in mind that the fact to be established
is forgiveness. Proving cohabitation is one method of prov-
ing forgiveness. In the absence of any other evidence tend-
ing to establish forgiveness, we hold that the single act of
intercourse alleged by defendant is not such a voluntary co-
habitation of the parties as to prove forgiveness." .1
Cases representative of the minority view that any sexual
intercourse between the spouses subsequent to defendant's mis-
conduct automatically operates as a condonation (assuming
knowledge of the misbehavior) are Huffine v. Huffine58 and
Collins v. Collins.5 9 In the Huffine controversy plaintiff (hus-
band) sued defendant for a divorce on the ground of cruelty, and
the latter testified, in defense, that subsequent to the filing of the
suit the parties had on several occasions had sexual contact.
Although it found plaintiff's charge of cruelty to be established,
the Van Wert County Common Pleas Court nevertheless denied
plaintiff a divorce, declaring:
"If there is condonation in this case, it must arise solely
from the resumption of marital intercourse, as there has been
no general forgiveness .... Purely as a moral proposition,
this Court does not feel that parties should be allowed to
maintain sexual relations and at the same time seek a di-
vorce, as the two acts are completely incompatible. The
Court feels that a single voluntary act of marital intercourse,
where the injured party is in full knowledge of the other
party's aggression, shall act as a condonation of all aggres-
sions up to that time." 60
In the Collins suit the wife petitioned for a legal separation,
basing her action on cruelty. The evidence presented sustained
plaintiff's charges but also revealed that three days before the
trial the plaintiff had held a rendezvous with defendant at a se-
cluded place outside the city and had voluntarily submitted to
57 Pages 342-43 of 115 N.Y.S. 2d. This decision required an interpretation
of § 171 of N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law, which reads as follows: "In either of the
following cases the plaintiff is not entitled to a divorce, although the adul-
tery is established: . . . (2) Where the offense charged has been forgiven by
the plaintiff. The forgiveness may be proved, either affirmatively, or by the
voluntary cohabitation of the parties with knowledge of the fact." In accord
with the Seiferth and Kinley holdings are Blackshear v. Blackshear, 45 So.
2d 675 (Fla. 1950); Hickman v. Hickman, 188 Iowa 697, 176 N.W. 698 (1920);
and Dion v. Dion, 128 Conn. 116, 23 A. 2d 314 (1941).
5s 48 Ohio L. Abs. 430, 74 N.E. 2d 764 (1947).
59 194 La. 446, 193 So. 702 (1940).
60 74 N.E. 2d at 766.
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sexual relations with him in his car. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana ruled that plaintiff was barred from relief, having con-
doned defendant's cruelty. Said the court:
"The wife's conduct towards her husband on that occa-
sion (the rendezvous) was a complete condonation of all
offenses on his part that she had knowledge of, and was not
consistent with an intention on her part to prosecute her
suit for separation from bed and board .... (T) he suit is
ordered dismissed for having become abated by the recon-
ciliation of the parties." 61
(3) The tendency to demand more evidence of forgiveness when
the wife is the aggrieved party:
Participation in marital coitus signifies forgiveness only
when such participation is voluntary.62 Since the wife has, his-
torically, been economically dependent upon her husband, and
since (being the weaker sex) she sometimes submits to her
mate's advances out of fear, the courts have long been slower to
draw inferences of forgiveness from an aggrieved wife's actions
than from an injured husband's conduct.63 Illustrative cases are
Beeby v. Beeby 4 and Glass v. Glass.6 5 In the Beeby case the
61 Pages 703-04 of 193 So. Accord, Henderson v. Henderson (1943) A.C. 49
and Rushmore v. Rushmore, 114 N.J. Eq. 151, 168 Atl. 614 (1933). The rule
of the Henderson case (prohibiting an aggrieved husband who had coitus
with his wife, knowing of her misconduct, from denying that he had for-
given her) is no longer operative in England today, for an English statute
now provides: "Any presumption of condonation which arises from the
continuance or resumption of marital intercourse may be rebutted by evi-
dence sufficient to negative the necessary intent." Matrimonial Causes Act,
1965, c. 72, s. 42 (1).
Even before enactment of the above-quoted statute (in 1963) the Eng-
lish courts had permitted the wife to rebut the presumption of condonation
that results from a resumption of sexual relations. Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hagg.
Ecc. 789, 162 Eng. Rep. 755 (1799); Morley v. Morley (1961), W.L.R. 211;
and W. v. W. (1962) P. 49.
62 "Condonation, to be effectual, must be the voluntary act of the injured
party and not induced by fraud, force, or fear." 27A C.J.S. § 60 (1959). See
Belville v. Belville, 114 Vt. 404, 45 A. 2d 571 (1946).
63 "(I)n the case of an innocent wife intercourse may not be as decisive.
When the innocent wife resumes sexual intercourse with her husband, the
resumption raises a presumption that she has condoned his wrong, but this
presumption can be rebutted by evidence that she was 'not her own mis-
tress' in the sense that her freedom of action was limited by her financial
dependence on her husband and her family responsibilities." MacDougall,
Proposals to Reform the Law of Condonation, 39 Australian L. J. 295, 297
(1966). Also see A. Jacobs and J. Goebel, Cases and Materials on Domestic
Relations 465 (4th ed. 1961).
64 1 Hagg. Ecc. 789, 162 Eng. Rep. 755 (1799).
65 175 Md. 693, 2 A. 2d 443 (1938).
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husband sought a divorce (a mensa et thoro) for adultery, and
the wife recriminated, charging that plaintiff was also guilty of
adultery. Plaintiff argued that defendant had condoned his trans-
gressions by continuing to cohabit with him for several months
after learning of his guilt. The Consistory Court (Lord Stowell)
ruled in favor of the wife, dismissing the husband's suit, speak-
ing thus:
"(T)he effect of cohabitation is justly held less stringent
on the wife; she is more sub potestate, 66 more inops concilii;
she may entertain more hopes of the recovery and reform
of her husband; . . . It would be hard if condonation by im-
plication was held a strict bar against the wife. It is not im-
proper she should for a time shew a patient forbearance;
she may find a difficulty either in quitting his house or in
withdrawing from his bed. The husband, on the other hand,
cannot be compelled to the bed of his wife; a woman may
submit to necessity." 67
The Glass controversy was a legal separation suit instituted
by the wife, who alleged cruelty. Defendant testified that the
parties occupied the same bedroom for two nights after the last
act of cruelty charged and that they had sexual relations on both
nights. Although defendant's testimony was corroborated by
other evidence, the Baltimore City Circuit nevertheless granted
plaintiff the relief sought by her, and the Maryland Court of
Appeals affirmed, saying:
"Condonation . . . with respect to a woman, is held not
to bear so strictly, because she should for a time show for-
bearance. . . . She may have no means of support except
under his roof; and under such circumstances it would be
hard ... to term submission mere hypocrisy .... (T) he rule
does not apply with equal force to the wife as to the hus-
band." 68
66 Translation: more "subject to the power of another."
67 Page 757 of 162 Eng. Rep. Accord, Duncan v. Duncan, 184 Ga. 602, 192
S.E. 215 (1937) and Martinique v. Martinique, 50 N.J. Super. 210, 141 A. 2d
562 (1958).
"The fact that the wife was in ill health, or feared for her personal
safety if she attempted to leave, or remained to protect her children, or
lacked sufficient funds or another abode are all factors to be taken into
consideration in determining the voluntariness of the cohabitation. For if
there is no free choice, there will be no cohabitation." Note, supra note 5,
at 108.
68 Page 447 of 2 A. 2d. Accord, Weber v. Weber, 195 Mo. App. 126, 189 S.W.
577 (1916). There the wife, Anna, cross-petitioned for a divorce, relying on
the grounds of adultery and intolerable indignities. The husband admitted
(Continued on next page)
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Since women today are, for the most part, less economically
dependent upon their husbands than wives used to be,6 9 since
women now play a less submissive role in the household than
they did in the past, and since the authorities are now more
willing than formerly to restrain and prosecute wife-beating hus-
bands,7 0 it is questionable whether the law should continue to
discriminate in favor of the wife in this matter.7 1
(4) The tendency to demand more evidence of forgiveness when
the divorce ground relied upon is a continuing transgression:
The courts recognize a distinction between the condonation
of immediately-consummated offenses, such as adultery, and the
condonation of continuing transgressions, such as cruelty. When
the malfeasance of the defendant-spouse involves a course of
conduct, rather than a single intolerable incident, the aggrieved
spouse is often inclined to endure the misconduct for a while in
the hope that his mate's comportment will improve. The courts,
recognizing this-and not wishing to penalize such forbearance-
are slow to interpret the continuance of conjugal cohabitation as
sufficient evidence of forgiveness to produce a condonation. "The
(Continued from preceding page)
the truth of Anna's allegations but testified that following the separation
occasioned by his misconduct she slept with him two nights at his sister's
house. The Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed a decree granting Anna
a divorce, observing: "In divorce proceedings, cohabitation offers strong
evidence of . . . forgiveness of past conjugal offenses .... Much must de-
pend, however, on the circumstances of the particular case. The doctrine of
condonation is not applied with such strictness to the rights of the wife as
it is to those of the husband ... ." Page 578 of 189 S.W.
69 In the period during which the Beeby case was decided a wife had vir-
tually no property of her own (because of such doctrines as seisen jure
uxoris and curtesy). She could not even make a valid contract or (without
acting through her husband) collect her choses in action. Moreover, it was
very difficult for a woman to earn a living outside the home, since few jobs
were open to women, and those that were (such as governess work and
domestic service) generally paid little. The women's position in society to-
day is different in all these respects. See A. Casner and W. Leach, Cases
and Text on Property 283 and 287 (1951); Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrim-
ination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 Kan. City L. Rev. 213, 253 (1942); and
H. Clark, Domestic Relations 70-76 (1954).
70 "According to Blackstone and the early cases, the husband formerly had
the right to give his wife moderate correction. No such right, however, is
recognized today. Chastisement is unlawful in any case, and will render
the husband guilty of assault and battery." J. Madden, Handbook of the
Law of Persons and Domestic Relations § 52 (1931).
71 This statement should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the con-
donation doctrine. (In Part VI, infra, the writer recommends the abolition
or modification of the doctrine.) However, as long as the rule is retained
in its present form it probably should henceforth be applied to husbands
and wives with equal force.
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better established rule seems to be that cruelty, as well as adul-
tery, may be the subject of condonation, . . .but the principle re-
quires evidence of an unequivocal intent to forgive and to volun-
tarily resume marital relations." 72
Illustrative cases are McCarthy v. McCarthy73 and Heckman
v. Heckman.74  The McCarthy controversy was a cruelty-
grounded divorce suit instituted by the husband, who charged
his wife with misbehavior committed over the period of a year.
Defendant argued that plaintiff condoned her misconduct by re-
suming cohabitation with her for two months following a period
of separation. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed
a judgment granting plaintiff a divorce, saying:
"The cruelty which affords cause for divorce ordinarily
is cumulative and augmented by addition, consisting of a
continued and persistent course of conduct or a series of
acts or circumstances occurring while the parties are still
living together. Continuance of marital relations, if main-
tained and endured with a reasonable hope for better treat-
ment or a better understanding, until forbearance ceases to
be a virtue, does not constitute condonation, nor do conces-
sions made or a reconciliation entered into with like senti-
ments and to a like end." 15
In the Heckman case the wife petitioned for a divorce based
on a pattern of cruel conduct extending over a period of three
years. Since the parties continued to cohabit throughout this
time (except for a four-month period that defendant spent work-
ing in North Carolina), defendant contended that plaintiff had
72 Note, Condonation-Effect of a Single Act of Sexual Intercourse, 44 Ky.
L. J. 241, 243 (1955). "(I)n the cruelty cases, where the offense is a course
of conduct, rather than a single act, the rule seems almost uniform that the
defense of condonation arises only where there is actual forgiveness." Note,
Condonation as Defense to Action Based on Cruelty, 28 N.Y.U.L. Quar. 1047,
1048 (1953).
Six jurisdictions have statutes (cited at note 44 supra) providing that
condonation cannot be invoked in cases grounded on misdeeds of a contin-
uing character without evidence of express forgiveness.
The California enactment exemplifies these statutes:
"Where the cause of divorce consists of a course of offensive con-
duct, or arises, in cases of cruelty, from excessive acts of ill treatment
which may aggregately constitute the offense, cohabitation, or passive
endurance, or conjugal kindness shall not be evidence of condonation
of any of the acts constituting such cause, unless accompanied by an
express agreement to condone."
73 123 Conn. 409, 195 Atl. 607 (1937).
74 235 Ind. 472, 134 N.E. 2d 695 (1956).
75 Page 608 of 195 Atl.
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condoned his misconduct. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed
a decree awarding plaintiff a divorce, speaking as follows:
" 'The rule is that sexual cohabitation after acts of
cruelty cannot be considered as condonation in the sense in
which it would be after an act of adultery.' The effort to en-
dure unkind treatment as long as possible is commendable;
and it is obviously a just rule that the patient endurance by
the wife of her husband's continuous ill-treatment should
never be allowed to weaken her title to relief." 76
Assuming that the condonation rule should be retained, one
questions whether there is really any need to apply the doctrine
with greater restraint in continuing-transgression cases than in
other situations. If Jack, an injured spouse, continues to cohabit
with his wife, Jill, after the latter has acted cruelly, and Jill
thereafter treats Jack with kindness, then Jack has no cause for
complaint. He elected to continue the marriage in the hope that
Jill would reform, and his hope has been realized. On the other
hand, if Jill's behavior does not improve, then Jack is protected
by the principle of revival-that is, by the principle that Jill's
earlier cruelty, though condoned, has been resurrected by her
later malfeasance. One authority speculates that when the courts
say that a spouse's cruelty has not been condoned what they
probably mean is that, though condoned, it has been revived.77
(5) The argument that the forgiveness requirement should be
eliminated and that condonation should be regarded as a
rule of waiver:
Professor Frank Reader, in an article which has received
considerable attention, has proposed that the forgiveness require-
ment be abolished and that condonation be considered a rule of
election. 78  More specifically, under this proposal an injured
spouse who voluntarily had sexual intercourse with his mate,
76 Page 699 of 134 N.E. 2d. In the first sentence the court was quoting from
17 Am. Jur. Divorce and Separation § 210 (1935). Accord, Smith v. Smith,205 Miss. 794, 40 So. 2d 156 (1949) and Sollie v. Sollie, 202 Va. 855, 120 S.E.
2d 281 (1961). Quoting from the latter case: "(C)ruelty is cumulative, ad-
mitting of degrees and augmented by additions, so that it may be condoned
and even forgiven for a time, and up to a certain point, without any bar tobringing it all forward when a continuance of it has rendered it no longer
condonable." Page 285 of 120 S.E. 2d.
77 Annot. 109 A.L.R. 683 (1937).
78 Reader, supra note 9, at 97-100. Among the works raking favorable ref-
erence to Reader's article are Clark, op. cit. supra note 45 at 585 and Jacobs
and Goebel, op. cit. supra note 63 at 462.
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knowing that the latter had committed a marital transgression,
would automatically be deemed to have condoned the offense.
It is said that two advantages would accrue from the adoption
of this recommendation: First, the difficulties involved in at-
tempting to ascertain the mental state of the plaintiff-spouse
would be obviated, thereby making for more certainty in the
application of the condonation doctrine. Secondly, equitable re-
sults would be achieved with more consistency, since it would
no longer be possible for an aggrieved husband to continue for
a time enjoying the benefits of marital intercourse-thereby in
reality affirming the marriage-and to then obtain a dissolution
of the marriage (by showing that he never actually forgave his
wife). Amplifying upon the second advantage, Reader says:
"Where a wife has committed adultery and the husband
knows that fact why should he not be required to choose
between a continuance of marital cohabitation and the right
to a divorce? . . . Looking at the situation realistically, it is
the adultery that terminates the marriage and not the subse-
quent proof thereof in the lawsuit. . . . Continued marital
cohabitation by the husband after such factual termination
of the marriage no more deserves the stamp of approval,
moral or legal, than intercourse after divorce; unless we
treat it as a waiver of the offense and as a factual reinstate-
ment of the marriage by mutual consent. For the court to
say you may have a divorce, since you did not forgive her
is to countenance sexual intercourse after the termination of
the relationship which gave legal and moral sanction to that
conduct." 79
Reader's concept of condonation finds some support in the
cases. In Cramp v. Cramp"° an adultery-based divorce suit insti-
tuted by the husband, it was revealed that plaintiff had copulated
with defendant after learning of her licentiousness, but defend-
ant admitted that plaintiff never forgave her. The Probate Divi-
sion nevertheless ruled that plaintiff had condoned his wife's
misbehavior and thereby barred himself from relief. Quoting
from the opinion:
"In the Oxford Dictionary the meaning of the word
'forgive' is said to be 'To give up resentment against, to
pardon.' Forgiveness in this sense is not . . .essential to the
proof of condonation. . . . (T)he truer definition of con-
donation is that it is a conditional waiver of the right of the
79 Reader, supra note 9, at 98.
80 (1920) P. 158.
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injured spouse to take matrimonial proceedings, and it is not
forgiveness at all in the ordinary sense .... A man cannot,
I think, use the body of his wife for sexual ends and an-
nounce to her at the same time that he will not forgive her
adultery, but will present a petition to dissolve the marriage
bond." 81
Holsworth v. Holsworth 2 represents a similar holding. There
the wife sought a divorce for cruelty. Although the evidence
sustained her allegations of cruel treatment, it also disclosed that
after the brief separation which followed his last act of cruelty
plaintiff returned to defendant for several days, in order to ob-
tain custody of her child. During this period she lived with de-
fendant as his wife, although arranging to file for a divorce. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that plaintiff
waived her right to obtain a divorce by resuming cohabitation
with defendant, regardless of whether she actually forgave him.
Said the court:
"Her return was for the purpose of taking the child from
its father, and with no intention of forgiving her husband.
... Her conduct nevertheless constitutes condonation of the
offenses charged in the libel. The husband or wife who,
knowing of marital offenses committed by the other, con-
tinues to live with that other in marital relations, condones
the offense and cannot set it up as a ground of divorce." 83
If the condonation doctrine is to be retained at all, then the
general adoption of Reader's recommendation would probably
represent an improvement. The first-mentioned advantage of
Reader's proposal-that it would lead to greater certainty in the
doctrine's application-is by no means an illusory one, for it is
unquestionably easier to determine whether a couple have re-
sumed (or continued) coital relations than it is to ascertain
whether the offended spouse has in fact forgiven his mate.
However, the general acceptance of Reader's recommendation
would necessitate changing the law in those states (a minority)8 4
which hold that words of forgiveness alone can amount to con-
donation and in those jurisdictions (a majority)s8 which hold that
81 Pages 163 and 170 of (1920) P.
82 252 Mass. 132, 147 N.E. 578 (1925).
83 Page 579 of 147 N.E.
84 Supra part II B (1).
85 Supra part II B (2).
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the resumption (or continuation) of conjugal intercourse is
merely presumptive evidence of forgiveness and consequently
not an absolute bar to relief.
III. Revival of Condoned Transgressions
It is well established that condonation is conditional and that
the condoned infraction will be revived if the errant spouse
thereafter fails to treat his mate with substantial conjugal kind-
ness.86 Five jurisdictions have statutes expressly so providing.8 7
This feature of condonation has been recognized at least since the
early English case of Worsley v. Worsley.
s8
The later misbehavior need not, to revive the earlier mis-
conduct, constitute cause for divorce of itself . 9  "Subsequent
offenses on the part of a spouse after condonation of former
offenses, which were sufficient to warrant a divorce, nullify the
condonation and revive the original offenses as a cause for di-
vorce, even though the fresh acts are not in themselves sufficient
to warrant a divorce...., 90 To require that the reviving trans-
86 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 59 (1959); Bridwell v. Bridwell, 217 Ark. 514, 231
S.W. 2d 117 (1959); and Arnold v. Arnold, 76 Cal. App. 2d 877, 174 P. 2d
674 (1946).
In England, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas statutes provide that
adultery, once condoned, is not revivable. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965
(c. 72) s. 42 (3); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 52 (1955) (see Bronson v. Bronson,
7 Phila. 405 (1870)); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-811 (1955); and Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. art. 4630 (1960) (see Nogees v. Nogees, 7 Tex. 538, 58 Am. Dec. 78
(1852)). The Pennsylvania act reads as follows:
"In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the
respondent shall allege and prove, or if it shall appear in the evidence,
that the libellant . . . has admitted the respondent into conjugal society
or embraces after he or she knew of the criminal fact, . . .it shall be a
good defense and a perpetual bar against the same."
87 Cal. Civ. Code § 117 (1954); Idaho Code Ann. § 32-614 (1958); Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 21-123 (1961); N. D. Cent. Code § 14-05-13 (1960); and S. D.
Code § 14.0716 (1939).
The Montana enactment, which typifies those comprising this group,
reads as follows: "Condonation implies a condition subsequent, that the for-
giving party must be treated with conjugal kindness."
88 2 Lee 572, 161 Eng. Rep. 444 (1730). It was there held that a husband's
subsequent acts of cruelty revived his earlier adultery.
89 Annot., 32 A.L.R. 2d 107, 116 (1953).
90 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 193 Pa. Super. 628, 165 A. 2d 127 (1960). "Con-
donation of a matrimonial offense . . . is always conditional, at least for a
reasonable time .. .upon the forgiven spouse's refraining from subsequent
acts of conjugal unkindness, and the reviving act of unkindness need not
rise to the gravity of an independent statutory matrimonial offense." Low-
ensten v. Lowensten, 79 N.J. Super. 124, 190 A. 2d 882, 887 (1963).
23
Moore: Examination of Condonation Doctrine
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1969
2 AKRON LAW REVIEW (2)
gression amount to an independent ground for divorce would ob-
viously render the revival principle useless, for there is no need
to rely upon the earlier misbehavior if one can obtain a divorce
by proving the later misdeeds alone.91
If the subsequent offenses need not of themselves represent
grounds for divorce, how culpable must they be to produce a
revival? What constitutes a breach of "conjugal kindness"?
Four jurisdictions92 have statutes providing that a condona-
tion is nullified "when the condonee is guilty of great conjugal
unkindness, not amounting to a cause of divorce, but sufficiently
habitual and gross to show that the conditions of condonation
had not been accepted in good faith or not fulfilled." In other
states the courts have devised a variety of tests. Different juris-
dictions have declared that the reviving misconduct must be:
(a) "both grave and weighty, repugnant not merely to the feel-
ings of the condoned spouse, but to the standards of conduct im-
posed on each of the spouses by the marital bond"; 93 (b) "such
as to place the innocent party in fear of being subjected again
to the original offense"; 94 (c) "conduct which in the eye of the
court is wrong ... provided always that it be sufficiently serious
for the court to regard it as a substantial breach of duty"; 95
(d) "of such a character to indicate the bad faith of his (the
offender's repentance"; 96 (e) "of such a grave nature as to raise
a reasonable probability that the condition upon which forgive-
ness was given was not accepted in good faith"; 97 and (f) "so
pronounced as to raise a reasonable probability that if the mari-
tal relations is continued, a new cause for a divorce will be
given." 98 The diversity of the tests used by the courts indicates
that one cannot precisely measure the minimum of misconduct
which will nullify a condonation. One can merely assert that it
91 See Wilson, Revival of Condoned Adultery, 14 The Fortnightly L. J. 294
(1945).
92 Cal. Civ. Code § 121 (1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 21-127 (1961);
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-05-14 (1960); and S.D. Code § 1407.17 (1939).
93 Bridges v. Bridges (1944), 45 S.R. (N.S.W.) 164, 179.
94 Osborn v. Osborn, 174 Mass. 399, 54 N.E. 868 (1899).
95 Beard v. Beard (1946) P. 8, 22.
96 Currence v. Currence, 123 W. Va. 599, 18 S.E. 2d 656, 658 (1942).
97 Kollar v. Kollar, 155 Fla. 705, 21 So. 2d 356 (1945).
98 Marshall v. Marshall, 65 Vt. 238, 26 Atl. 900 (1892).
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must classify as misbehavior more serious than a triffing delin-
quency. 9
9
It has long been established that the reviving transgression
need not be an offense of the same character as the original
wrong.100 Thus adultery is revivable by cruelty10 ' or desertion,
0 2
and cruelty is revivable by adultery 10 3 or desertion. 10 4 Similarly,
desertion may be resurrected by subsequent cruelty.10 5 "It is not
necessary that the subsequent injury be of the same kind or be
proved with the same clearness." 106
Since the operation of the revival principle is not restricted
by any specific time limit, it is theoretically possible for an
offense committed many years past to be reactivated by subse-
quent misconduct. This means that an erring spouse who induces
his mate to pardon his transgressions occupies a probationary
position for an indefinite period thereafter. This feature of the
revival rule has been eloquently criticized:
"Must these people really be told that the law actually
forbids them to re-establish their marriage on any other than
a precarious basis; that they were mistaken in supposing that
they had thrown into the sea-twenty years before, it may
be-the hatchet that might then have severed their lives;
and that the hatchet was, in fact (without their knowledge
and contrary to their wishes) buried in quite a shallow
grave, and has lain there ready to be disinterred, for use
with fatal results, on the happening of comparatively slight
matrimonial misconduct in the future? . . . I have the great-
99 Annot., 32 A.L.R. 2d 107, 167 (1953) and Nelson op. cit. supra note 1, at§ 11.08. Quoting from the latter authority:
"Condonation is not nullified by harmless ... acts or circumstances
not violative of the spirit of the compact .... This (conditional charac-
ter of condonation) does not require that the offending spouse become,
overnight, a model husband or wife ... "
100 This was first recognized in the old English case of Worsley v. Worsley,
2 Lee 572, 161 Eng. Rep. 444 (1730).
101 Smith v. Smith, 225 Md. 282, 170 A. 2d 195 (1961) and Bravo v. Bravo,
N.J. Eq. 56, 114 Atl. 790 (1921).
102 Beard v. Beard (1946) P. 8 and Bennet v. Bennet, 48 Cal. App. 670, 192
Pac. 180 (1920).
103 Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 339 Mich. 72, 62 N.W. 2d 623 (1954) and Palmer v.
Palmer, 2 S.W. and Tr. 61, 164 Eng. Rep. 914 (1861).
104 Mathewson v. Mathewson, 81 Vt. 173, 69 AtI. 646 (1908) and Zuerrer v.
Zuerrer, 238 Iowa 402, 27 N.W. 2d 260 (1947).
105 Holt v. Holt, 64 App. D. C. 280, 77 F. 2d 538 (1935).
106 Tootle v. Tootle, 329 S.W. 2d 218 (Mo. 1959). In this case the court held
that adultery was revived by cruelty.
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est difficulty in persuading myself that this can be the law,
and that the invariable consequence of, and penalty for, a
condoned offense is a lifelong period of probation, rendering
the offender liable to be called up for inevitable judgment
thereon if he or she commits any other conjugal offense
whatsoever at any time, however distant, thereafter." 107
This criticism, though not devoid of merit, fails to acknowl-
edge three mitigating factors. First, in England (where the criti-
cism was voiced) it has long been possible to effect an absolute
(non-nullifiable) condonation by executing a deed containing a
clause stating that the spouses agree to refrain from pleading or
mentioning any past offense in any subsequent proceedings be-
tween them. In Rose v. Rose,1 0 8 a divorce suit grounded on cruel-
ty and adultery, it was disclosed that the parties had executed
such a deed and that the defendant-husband had thereafter com-
mitted adultery. Plaintiff contended that the clause in question
was against public policy and therefore unenforceable, but the
Probate Division rejected this argument and held that the clause
prevented the later adultery from reviving the earlier cruelty.
Quoting from the opinion:
"It appears to me perfectly consistent with public policy
to hold that there may be what, for want of a better term,
I will call final condonation. In the old Ecclesiastical Courts
condonation was never final, but I do not see that public pol-
icy is against final condonation .... That by-gones should be
by-gones is as advantageous between husband and wife as
between any other parties." 109
Secondly, in England and at least ten American jurisdictions
there are statutes imposing a time restriction on divorce ac-
107 Beard v. Beard (1946) P. 8, 29-30 (dissenting opinion of Justice Vaisey).
In this case the Probate Division held that a wife's adultery, though con-
doned, was revived by her subsequent desertion for less than the statutory
three-year desertion period. The English statute making condoned adultery
not revivable (Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 (c. 72) s. 42 (3)) was not en-
acted until 1963.
108 (1883) 8 P. and D. 98.
109 Page 99 of 8 P. & D. The wife was attempting to combine the earlier
cruelty with the later adultery and thereby obtain a divorce a vinculo. The
Probate Division ruled that the deed precluded consideration of the for-
mer and that she was therefore entitled merely to a legal separation.
It appears that to accomplish such a non-erasable condonation the
spouses must either execute a deed or make a formal agreement supported
by consideration. See Crocker v. Crocker (1921) P. 25 and Mitchell, Con-
donation and the Matrimonial Hatchet, 62 L. Quar. Rev. 121 (1946).
Spring, 1969
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 2 [1969], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol2/iss2/1
EXAMINATION OF CONDONATION DOCTRINE
tions," 0 and the limitation fixed by these statutes cannot be cir-
cumvented by use of the revival principle. All but one"' of the
American acts designate a specific time limit"' within which to
sue, while the English statute merely prohibits an "unreasonable
delay." 113 All but three" 4 of the American statutes absolutely
bar an action not instituted within the specified time, while the
English act makes failure to bring suit promptly merely a dis-
cretionary bar to relief.115 The enactments of New York and
California are illustrative:
"In either of the following cases, the plaintiff is not en-
titled to a divorce, although the adultery is established:
a . . 3. Where there has been no express forgiveness,
and no voluntary cohabitation of the parties, but the action
was not commenced within five years after the discovery
by the plaintiff of the offense charged." 116
"A divorce must be denied:
One-When the cause is adultery and the action is not
commenced within two years after the commission of the act
of adultery, or after its discovery by the injured party; or,
Two-When the cause is conviction of a felony, and the
action is not commenced before the expiration of two years
after a pardon, or the termination of the period of sentence.
Three-In all other cases when there is an unreasonable
lapse of time before the commencement of the action." 117
110 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 (c. 72) s. 4; Cal. Civ. Code § 124 (1954);
Idaho Code Ann. § 32-615 (1958); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 3-1202 (1965); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 552.41 (1967); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 21-130 (1961); N. D.
Cent. Code § 14-05-16 (1960); N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 171; S. D. Code
§ 14.0719 (1939); W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-2-14 (1966); and Wyo. Stat. § 20-54
(1959).
111 N. D. Cent. Code § 14-05-16 (1960). This act provides that a decree must
be denied when there has been "an unreasonable lapse of time" between
commission of the offense and the commencement of the action.
112 The enactments of California, Montana, and South Dakota merely forbid
waiting an "unreasonable lapse of time" in the case of some marital offenses,
but they impose precise time limits in the case of others. Cal. Civ. Code
§ 124; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 21-130 (1961); and S. D. Code § 14.0719
(1939).
113 The English statute reads thus: (4) "The Court may dismiss a petition
for divorce if-. . . (c) in its opinion the petitioner has been guilty- (i) of
unreasonable delay in presenting or prosecuting the petition"; Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1965 (c. 72) s. 5. (4).
114 Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.41 (1967); Minn. Stat. Ann. §518.08 (1947); and
Wyo. Stat. § 20-54 (1959).
115 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 (c. 72) s. 5 (4).
116 N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 171.
117 Cal. Civ. Code § 124 (1954).
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Thirdly, even in jurisdictions having no statutes compelling
the aggrieved spouse to bring suit within a given time the courts
are usually unreceptive to a claim that an offending husband or
wife has revived a transgression committed a long time pre-
viously. The judicial antipathy toward such a claim is exem-
plified by the cases of Singewald v. Singewald,118 and Welch v.
Welch." 9 The former was a cruelty-grounded legal separation
instituted by the wife. Plaintiff rested her case in substantial
part on cruelty committed in 1919. However, plaintiff admitted
that following a brief separation in the latter part of 1919 she
had resumed marital cohabitation with defendant until shortly
before commencing her suit (in 1932). To counter the argument
that she had condoned the 1919 cruelty, she contended that de-
fendant's misconduct in 1932 had revived the earlier malfeasance.
The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's contention
and affirmed a decree denying plaintiff a divorce, saying:
"While condonation is based upon . . . the implied con-
dition that a breach of the promise revokes the condonation
... there must of necessity be some limitation to that rule.
And where the offenses sought to be revived are so remote
in point of time, and the conduct of the parties has been of
a character indicating that the complainant has finally and
unconditionally surrendered any and all rights to complain
of such offenses, they may not be revived as a separate and
sufficient ground for divorce." 120
In the Welch controversy, a divorce suit initiated by the
wife and based on cruelty, plaintiff relied heavily on two acts of
physical cruelty committed early in the marriage, one occurring
in 1946 and the other, in 1948. Plaintiff admitted that she con-
tinued to live with defendant until August of 1954, but she ar-
gued that any condonation resulting from her continuance of
cohabitation was cancelled in August of 1954, when defendant
struck her during a domestic dispute. The New Jersey Superior
Court rejected plaintiff's revival argument and dismissed her
complaint, speaking as follows:
"Even if the assault were found to have occurred in
August, 1954, it would not . . .operate to revive the acts of
cruelty in 1946 and 1948 as a basis for the instant cause of
118 165 Md. 136, 166 Atl. 441 (1933).
119 34 N. J. Super. 197, 111 AtI. 2d 793 (1955).
120 Page 443 of 166 AtI.
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action. The long and continued period of subsequent co-
habitation ... must be deemed to wipe the slate clear, so far
as the early incidents are concerned .... It is not consonant
with stability of the marriage relationship or the encourage-
ment of domestic concord that an early act of cruelty should
be held, notwithstanding long years of subsequent marital
cohabitation free from cruelty, necessarily to constitute an
effective basis of dissolution of the marriage at the instance
of a spouse offended by an entirely isolated act of conjugal
unkindness at a later time. Such a concept would hang a
sword of Damocles over the threshold of many a normal
household." 121
In view of the availability of the Rose v. Rose clause, the
statutes of limitation on divorce suits in a number of jurisdic-
tions, and the courts' general antipathy toward the revival of old
transgressions, it seems fair to say that Justice Vaisey's criticism
of the revival principle reflects a fear of abuse that the realities
of the situation do not justify. It is nevertheless submitted that
those jurisdictions without statutes of limitations on divorce ac-
tions would do well to enact such legislation. It should not be
even theoretically possible for a person to resurrect some ancient
misdeed of his mate and use the same as ammunition in a divorce
action.
IV. Present Legal Status of Condonation
in the United States and England
A. In the United States
Twenty-six jurisdictions have statutes declaring condonation
to be a bar to divorce 122 and in the remaining states it is con-
sidered a common law defense, inherited from the ecclesiastical
121 Pages 795-96 of 111 A. 2d. Accord, Narisi v. Narisi, 229 Ark. 1059, 320
S.W. 2d 757 (1959) and Scullin v. Scullin, 65 R.I. 91, 13 A. 2d 702 (1940).
122 Ala. Code tit. 34, § 26 (1959); Alaska Comp. Laws § 56-5-11 (1960);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-313 (1956); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 111 and 115-121
(1954); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-1-4 (1953); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §§ 1524
and 1528 (1953); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-109 (1960); Hawaii Rev. Laws tit. 324-
26 (1961); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 32-611 and 32-614 (1958); Ind. Stat. Ann.
§ 3-1202 (1965); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.040 (1962); La. Civ. Code Ann. art.
152 (1957); Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.41 (1967); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.08
(1947); Miss. Code Ann. § 2735 (1957); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 21-118 and
21-121-27 (1961); N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 171; N. D. Cent. Code §§ 14-05-10
and 14-05-13 and 14 (1960); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.070 (1965); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 23, § 52 (1955); S. D. Code §§ 14.0713 and 14.0716-17 (1939); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-811 (1955); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4630 (1960); W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 48-2-14 (1966); Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1959); and Wyo. Stat. § 20-54 (1959).
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law.123 Four jurisdictions 1 24 have extremely comprehensive en-
actments, that is, statutes which contain: a definition of condo-
nation, a listing of the elements comprising the rule, a statement
of the revival principle, a description of the kind of evidence
which establishes condonation of a continuing transgression, and
a specification of how a condonation can be nullified.125 The
statutes of three jurisdictions 126 provide that condonation is
merely a discretionary bar to relief.1 27 The acts of fourteen
123 Note, supra note 5, at 99-100 and 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation
§202 (1966).
124 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 111 and 115-121 (1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 21-
118 and 21-121-27 (1961); N. D. Cent. Code §§ 14-05-10 and 14-05-13 and 14
(1960); and S. D. Code §§ 14.0713 and 14.0716-17 (1939).
125 The North Dakota act exemplifies the four making up this group:
§ 14-05-10. "Divorces must be denied upon showing: ...
3. Condonation...
§ 14-05-13. "Condonation is the conditional forgiveness of a matrimonial
offense constituting a cause of divorce. The following requirements are
necessary to condonation:
1. A knowledge on the part of the condoner of the facts constituting
the cause of divorce;
2. Reconciliation and remission of the offense by the injured party;
and
3. Restoration of the offending party to all marital rights.
Condonation implies a condition subsequent that the forgiving party
must be treated with conjugal kindness. When the cause of divorce
consists of a course of offensive conduct, or arises in cases of cruelty
from successive acts of ill treatment, which aggregately may constitute
the offense, cohabitation, or passive endurance, or conjugal kindness
shall not be evidence of condonation of any of the acts constituting such
cause, unless accompanied by an express agreement to condone. In such
cases, condonation can be made only after the cause of divorce has be-
come complete as to the acts complained of.
§ 14-05-14. "Revocation of condonation.-Condonation is revoked and
the original cause of divorce revived:
1. When the condonee commits acts constituting a like or other
cause of divorce; or
2. When the condonee is guilty of great conjugal unkindness, not
amounting to a cause of divorce, but sufficiently habitual and gross to
show that the conditions of condonation had not been accepted in good
faith or not fulfilled."
126 Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.41 (1967); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.08 (1947); and
Wyo. Stat. § 20-54 (1959).
127 The Minnesota act, which is very similar to those of the other two states,
reads as follows:
"In any action brought for a divorce on the ground of adultery,
although the fact of adultery be established, the court may deny a di-
vorce in the following cases:
(2) When there has been an express forgiveness of the adultery
charged, or a voluntary cohabitation of the parties, with knowledge
thereof."
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states1 18 expressly provide for the doctrine's application only
when the divorce ground relied upon is adultery; however, the
courts of the last-mentioned states do not in practice restrict use
of the doctrine to suits based on adultery.129 One jurisdiction,
Illinois, has a statute enabling the parties to a divorce action to
have the condonation rule suspended as to them, so that they can
attempt a reconciliation without prejudicing their rights to obtain
a divorce in the event their peace-making efforts prove unsuc-
cessful. The act reads as follows:
"During the pendency of any suit for divorce, the Court
shall, upon the written stipulation of both the husband and
the wife that they desire to attempt a reconciliation, enter
an order suspending any or all orders and proceedings for
such time as the Court in its discretion may determine ad-
visable under the circumstances so as to permit the parties
to attempt such reconciliation without prejudice to their re-
spective rights. During the period of such suspension the
parties may resume living together as husband and wife and
their acts and conduct in so doing shall not be deemed a
condonation of any prior misconduct. Such suspension shall
be revoked upon motion of either party, by order of the
Court." 130
B. In England
An English statute provides for the operation of condonation
as a defense in suits grounded on adultery or cruelty. 131 The act
specifies that adultery, once forgiven, cannot be revived. In 1963
the statute was amended to allow estranged spouses to resume
(or continue) cohabitation for a period of up to three months
without forfeiting their rights to procure a divorce if their efforts
at reconciliation prove futile. The amendment reads thus:
128 Ala. Code tit. 34, § 26 (1959); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-313 (1956);
Hawaii Rev. Laws tit. 324-26 (1961); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 3-1202 (1965); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.040 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.41 (1967); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 518.08 (1947); Miss. Code Ann. § 2735 (1957); N. Y. Dom. Rel.
Law § 171; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 52 (1955); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-811
(1955); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4630 (1960); W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-2-14
(1966); and Wyo. Stat. § 20-54 (1959).
129 Graves v. Graves, 123 Ind. App. 618, 112 N.E. 2d 869 (1953) (condonation
of cruelty); Starr v. Starr, 206 Miss. 1, 39 So. 2d 520 (1949) (cruelty); Lewis
v. Lewis, 60 York 28 (Pa. 1962) (desertion); Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn.
App. 306, 282 S.W. 2d 661 (1955) (cruelty); Crittenden v. Crittenden, 214
S.W. 2d 670 (Tex. 1948) (cruelty); and Miles v. Miles, 131 W. Va. 513, 48
S.E. 2d 669 (1948).
130 Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 40, § 21.2 (1961).
131 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 (c. 72) s. 5 (3).
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"For the purposes of this Act . .. adultery or cruelty
shall not be deemed to have been condoned by reason only
of a continuation or resumption of cohabitation between the
parties for one period not exceeding three months, or of any-
thing done during such cohabitation, if it is proved that the
cohabitation was continued or resumed . . .with a view to
effecting a reconciliation." 132
The obvious purpose of the amendment is to encourage efforts
at reconciliation. 133 This purpose appears to have been at least
partially frustrated by the recent decision of Brown v. Brown.34
Under this holding the immunity conferred by the amendment
does not cover the situation where the cohabitation is resumed
(or continued) in consequence of a reconciliation effected at the
outset, rather than in the hope of achieving a reconciliation. The
wife in the Brown case confessed to her husband that she had
committed adultery. The husband expressly forgave her and
continued for two months to treat her as his wife. Then he
changed his mind and left her, whereupon she sued him for sup-
port, alleging desertion. The husband contended that he was jus-
tified in leaving, since his mate was guilty of infidelity. To the
argument that he had condoned the adultery he replied that
under the 1963 amendment he was permitted to continue marital
cohabitation for up to three months without having his conduct
deemed a condonation of his wife's misbehavior. The Probate
Division rejected the husband's contention and held for the wife,
saying:
"The previous law could be said to have had the follow-
ing disadvantage: a resumption of cohabitation-and par-
ticularly perhaps a resumption of sexual intercourse between
the spouses-may actually promote reconciliation; that is,
promote a reconciliation which has not yet taken place, but
which might take place if the parties can live together and
have sexual intercourse again. But a spouse who has been
wronged might well be reluctant to resume cohabitation with
a view to reconciliation lest, if it were found that the parties
could not really be reconciled, he or she might be held to
have lost thereafter the right to complain of the wrong that
had been done .... It was to meet this problem that section
2 (1) of the Act of 1963 was passed.... It therefore does not
132 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 (c. 72) s. 42 (2).
133 Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, 1956 (Cmd.
9678) par. 242 (1) and Gibbon, Bars, Discretionary and Absolute, 115 The
Law Journal 291 (1966).
134 (1967) P. 105.
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cover cases where a continuation or resumption of cohabita-
tion is in consequence of reconciliation: only where it is with
a view to it." 135
Such a restrictive interpretation of the amendment threatens
to defeat its purpose. When the courts are still so ready to find
condonation within the three-month period an aggrieved spouse
must realistically recognize that it is still not safe to resume (or
continue) conjugal cohabitation (unless he is certain that a rec-
onciliation can be accomplished). It appears unlikely that the
amendment will effectively serve the purpose for which it was
designed unless it is reworded (or re-construed) to give the
injured spouse assurance that nothing done by him during the
statutory period will be treated as a condonation.
V. Objections to the Bar of Condonation
The doctrine of condonation, as it now operates throughout
most of the United States, is open to criticism on two grounds:
First, it is conceptually wedded to a fault-oriented concept of
divorce and has no relevance to the more modern, sociological
view of divorce as being simply a remedy for a couple whose
marriage-for whatever reason-has failed. Under the former
concept of divorce, which has clearly predominated until recent
years,1 36 it was at least logical to apply the condonation doctrine.
For if divorce is a remedy limited to spouses who have been
wronged, it is reasonable to hold that if a husband has once par-
doned his wife's transgressions, thereby cancelling her moral in-
debtedness to him, he no longer classifies as a wronged spouse
and is therefore no longer entitled to a divorce. Under this line
of reasoning it makes no difference whether or not the couple
have any prospects of making a success of their marriage. On
the other hand, under the sociological concept of divorce, if the
marriage has proven a failure, then the offense in question ought
135 Page 903 of 3 W.L.R. (1964). In Mackleworth v. Mackleworth (1964) 5
C.L. 371 (decided within a few months of the Brown case) it was held that
notwithstanding enactment of the new amendment, if the spouses' words
and actions are clearly indicative of a completed reconciliation within the
statutory period, then the court may properly hold that a condonation has
taken place. For a discussion of the Brown and Mackleworth cases see Mac-
Dougall, supra note 63, at 298-99.
136 See Neuner, Proposed New Techniques in the Law of Divorce-the Com-
promise Solution, 28 Iowa L. Rev. 272 (1943) and Jacobs & Goebel, op. cit.
supra note 51 at 410-11.
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to be seized upon to dissolve the marriage, whether it has been
condoned or not.
The second basis of criticism is that the condonation doctrine
discourages efforts at reconciliation. In 1956 the Royal Commis-
sion on Marriage and Divorce declared:
"In our opinion the factor most likely to promote a suc-
cessful reconciliation is that husband and wife should be able
to live together for a time (after commission of the misdeed)
in the matrimonial home. Reconciliation cannot thrive in the
atmosphere of a solicitor's office or over the table in a res-
taurant." 137
Under the present law, however, an aggrieved spouse who makes
an effort to forgive his mate and save his marriage forfeits his
right to subsequently use his partner's misbehavior as grounds
for divorce, if the marriage proves unsalvageable. Unless his
desire for a reconciliation is unwavering and his confidence of
being able to achieve one is great, he is likely to decide that the
cost of attempting salvage operations is too dear to pay. A Texas
marriage counselor has related that during a recent counseling
session one of his clients told him the following:
"To tell you the truth, I would like to try our marriage
again. I even mentioned it to my lawyer, but he discouraged
me a lot. He pointed out something I didn't know about-
called condonation. He said that if I let my husband come
back into the home again, even for one night, my divorce
suit was null and void. If the attempt to make up didn't
work out, I would have to start an entirely new action and
pay another retainer fee. That's not for me. I've already
sweated out fifty days waiting for my divorce .... I'm not
going to start all over again if we can't live together ... ." 138
Since a stable family life contributes to the welfare of society, it
would seem obvious that our divorce laws should be designed to
foster reconciliation efforts, rather than to discourage them.13 9
137 Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, 1956 (Cmd.
Paper 9678), par. 242.
138 Mayer, Suspension of Condonation Defense Increases Reconciliations,
28 Tex. Bar J. 737 (1965).
139 Even under the present law nearly thirty percent of those who file for
a divorce settle their differences and drop the proceedings at some point
before the end. id. at 789. This shows that a substantial percentage of those
who institute divorce proceedings are still not positive that they want to
dissolve their marriage, and suggests that in a legal environment more
favorable to reconciliation efforts perhaps as many as half of those who
commence divorce proceedings would salvage their marriage.
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VI. Possible Reforms
There are two possible remedial measures either of which
would avert the chief evil of the present law, its tendency to de-
ter attempts at reconciliation. The first approach would be to
simply abolish the bar of condonation. After all, the fact that the
petitioner is complaining of his mate's transgression is convincing
evidence that though perhaps forgiven, it has not been forgotten;
and the fact that the parties are in court demonstrates that the
marriage has not succeeded. Why, then, should so much signifi-
cance be attached to a resumption (or continuation) of marital
cohabitation, or to an oral expression of forgiveness? If such con-
duct signifies anything, it suggests that the marriage ought to be
dissolved, for it shows that the petitioner attempted to preserve
his shattered marriage and was unable to do so. It is submitted
that these considerations justify elimination of the condonation
doctrine altogether.
There are some, however, who object that the complete
abolition of condonation would make possible the reopening of
old wounds and that there ought to be some point in time when
action on a given grievance is foreclosed.140 This objection is
afflicted with two weaknesses: First, it overlooks the fact that
a number of jurisdictions have statutes of limitations barring suit
on a given marital offense after a specified period of time.
1 4 1
Secondly, it fails to recognize that in states without statutes of
limitations the courts generally restrict application of the revival
principle to misdeeds committed within the recent past,14 which
makes it reasonable to assume that if condonation were abro-
gated most courts would remain unreceptive to suits grounded
on stale grievances. However, in view of this objection-whether
valid or not-and in view of the apparently widespread feeling
that it is unfair to revoke a forgiveness once expressed or im-
plied,143 it is probably unrealistic to expect that many juris-
dictions will completely abolish condonation in the foreseeable
future.
The second approach, however, might well achieve accept-
ance by state legislatures. This measure would involve retaining
140 MacDougall, supra note 63, at 300.
141 Supra Part III.
142 Supra Part IV.
143 See Clinton, Condonation-Conditional Forgiveness? 109 The Solicitors'
Journal 182 (1965).
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the condonation doctrine but allowing a six-month period follow-
ing commission of a given marital transgression, during which
the injured spouse may continue (or resume) conjugal cohabi-
tation and/or orally express his forgiveness, without thereby
condoning his mate's malfeasance. To implement this measure
a state might enact a statute worded as follows:
"None of the divorce grounds listed in this chapter (or
title) shall be deemed to have been condoned by anything
said or done by the aggrieved spouse within one hundred and
eighty days after performance of the act(s) constituting the
ground."
This measure would have two advantages over the English
statute 144 and one advantage over the Illinois act: 145 (1) Since
it allows the spouses six months to strive for a reconciliation,
rather than the three months permitted by the English act, the
measure would give the couple more ample time to determine
whether their marital problems are solvable. (2) Since it im-
poses no restrictions on the motives or intentions of the spouses,
the measure would forestall stultifying judicial interpretations
such as that given the English act in Brown v. Brown.1 46 (3)
Since it provides for operation of the grace period in all situa-
tions, the measure would embrace more cases than does the Illi-
nois act, which permits a nonprejudicial resumption of cohabi-
tation only when the spouses, following the commencement of
divorce proceedings, apply in writing for the right to attempt
a reconciliation.
VII. Conclusion
The preceding pages have considered: the history of con-
donation; the elements comprising the doctrine; the revival prin-
ciple; the present state of the law on condonation in the United
States and England; the demerits of the doctrine; and the alter-
native reforms that might be undertaken to improve this area
of the law.
In his Essay on Criticism Alexander Pope declares:
"Good-nature and good sense must ever join:
To err is human, to forgive, divine." 147
144 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 (c. 72) s. 42 (2).
145 Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 40, § 21.2 (1961).
146 (1967). P. 105. Discussed supra Part IV B.
147 Pope, Essay on Criticism, Canto II, Lines 524-25.
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The Christian doctrine which Anglo-American society has
long professed to embrace supports this esteem for forgiveness.
148
That nearly all American jurisdictions nevertheless recognize
and enforce a law which discourages forgiveness in the marital
context is therefore mystifying, as well as deplorable.
148 "Leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be recon-
ciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift."
Matthew 5:24.
"For if ye forgive men their trespasses your heavenly Father will also
forgive you: But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your
Father forgive your trespasses."
Matthew 6:14-15.
"Judge not, and ye shall not be judged: condemn not, and ye shall not
be condemned: forgive and ye shall be forgiven."
Luke 6:37.
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